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Landreth v. Malik, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (December 24, 2009)1
FAMILY LAW – SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
 
Summary 
 An appeal from default judgment stemming from a property dispute ordered by the 
Family Court Division of the Eighth Judicial District Court  
 
Disposition/Outcome  
 Family court’s judgment voided because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  
Factual and Procedural History 
 Amit Malik (“Malik”) and Dlynn Landreth (“Landreth”) cohabitated together from July 
2001 until September 2005.  The parties were never married and did not have any children 
together during the course of their four-year relationship.  In September 2006, a year after the 
parties ended their relationship, Malik filed an action against Landreth in the family court 
division, seeking half of the equity in a Las Vegas home, half of certain personal property 
acquired during the relationship, and all of his separate property.  
 Malik properly served Landreth with the complaint in early October 2006.  During 
October and November, Malik granted several oral and written time extensions for Landreth to 
file an answer.  Because Landreth failed to answer, even after the extensions, Malik filed a notice 
of intent to apply for a default judgment in December.  In February 2007, Malik filed the default 
and served Landreth with notice of a default hearing.  During the hearing, Landreth moved to set 
aside default by alleging Malik granted her an additional time extension after the December 
notice of intent to apply for default judgment.  Reasoning that Landreth had numerous 
opportunities to answer, the family court granted default judgment to Malik and awarded him 
half the equity in the home and other personal property located within the residence.  
 Landreth appealed the decision to the Nevada Supreme Court on the previously            
un-argued basis of improper subject matter jurisdiction.  
Discussion 
Subject matter jurisdiction 
 Writing for a majority of four, Justice Douglas noted that subject matter jurisdiction 
concerns may be raised “. . . by the parties at any time, or sua sponte by a court of review, and 
cannot be conferred by the parties.”2
                                                          
1 By Kathleen Wilde 
  Admittedly, the Court observed that the issue of subject 
matter jurisdiction of family courts in judicial districts was an issue of first impression.  The 
Court then noted that family courts have limited jurisdiction because their authority is derived by 
state law.  In Nevada, Article 6, Section 6(2) of the state constitution specifies that the legislature 
2 Swan v. Swan, 106 Nev. 464, 468, 796 P.2d 221, 224 (1990).   
may provide for the establishment family courts and their jurisdiction.3
 In interpreting NRS 3.223, the Court began by looking to the statute’s plain meaning.  
The Court held that NRS 3.223 is unambiguous as written because the language of the statute 
specifically grants a family court jurisdiction over cases concerning family matters, such as 
divorce, child custody and support, and guardianship.  
  Using the 
constitutionally granted authority, the state legislature enacted NRS 3.0105 to create family 
courts and NRS 3.223 to specify the extent of original and exclusive jurisdiction of family 
courts.   
Reconciliation with state precedent 
 Next, the Court distinguished the case at bar from precedent cases.  In the 1984 case of 
Hay v. Hay, the Court allowed unmarried cohabitants to bring a cause of action in family court 
because the parties did not dispute jurisdiction and held themselves out as a married couple. 4
 Similarly, in Barelli v. Barelli, the Court permitted a family court to resolve supplemental 
issues surrounding an oral contract because the terms of the agreement related to alimony and 
community property. 
  
The Court noted that Hay did not control the dispute between Malik and Landreth because 
neither party claimed to be part of a married couple or familial unit.   
5
Application to the case before the Court 
  By contrast, the Court commented that Landreth and Malik never had a 
claim eligible for the family court, and as a result, supplemental jurisdiction could not apply.  
 The Court concluded that NRS 3.223 does not confer jurisdiction over real or personal 
property disputes between unmarried, childless parties because the plain language of the statute 
does not include such proceedings.  Because Malik and Landreth never married and did not have 
children together, the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case or to issue a 
default judgment.  Furthermore, because lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental 
defect, the Court concluded that the family court’s judgment was void.  
Dissenting Opinion 
 Writing for three members of the Court, Chief Justice Hardesty disagreed with the 
majority’s understanding of NRS 3.223.  The dissent reasoned that the statute was open to more 
than one interpretation and turned to legislative history to determine that family court judges are 
also district court judges.  Reasoning that district court judges receive their authority from the 
Nevada Constitution,6
                                                          
3 Section 6(2) states, “The legislature may provide by law for . . . The establishment of a family court as a division 
of any district court and may prescribe its jurisdiction.”  
 the dissent believed that legislatively created limitations were invalid.  
Furthermore, the dissent understood authority to hear family cases as an expanded judicial power 
for district court judges who are specially trained, rather than a separate specialty court.   
4 Hay v. Hay, 100 Nev. 196, 198, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (1984).  
5 Barelli v. Barelli, 113 Nev. 873, 878, 944 P.2d 246, 249 (1997).  
6 Chief Justice Hardesty specifically wrote, “In Nevada, judicial power is derived directly from Article 6, Section 
6(1) of the Nevada Constitution, empowering judges with the authority to act and determine justiciable 
controversies.”  
 Satisfied that the family court judge below had authority to hear the case, the dissent 
considered whether Landreth received proper notice.  The dissent noted that Nevada Rule of 
Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) requires heightened notice of intent to file a default if a party has 
appeared before a court.  Particularly where time extensions are granted, a party filing for default 
must also provide a subsequent notice after the completion of the time extension.  According to 
the dissent, the family court record did not clearly indicate if there were any time extensions 
granted after the initial notice of intent to apply for default judgment and as a result it was 
unclear whether an additional notice was required prior to the default hearing.  The dissent 
argued that notice is critical in default proceedings and it is judicial abuse of discretion to assume 
notice requirements are met without a clear showing.  Thus, the dissent concluded that the lower 
court’s judgment should have been reversed and remanded for further consideration of notice 
given to Landreth.  
Conclusion 
 Family courts are limited in subject matter jurisdiction to the areas explicitly conferred by 
the state legislature.  Where a court renders a judgment without the appropriate jurisdiction, the 
decision is void.  
